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Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum error-correcting codes are based on pairs of classical
codes which are mutually dual containing. Explicit constructions of such codes for large block-
lengths and with good error correcting properties are not easy to find. In this paper we propose
a construction of CSS codes which combines a classical code with a two-universal hash function.
We show, using the results of Renner and Koenig [17], that the communication rates of such codes
approach the hashing bound on tensor powers of Pauli channels in the limit of large block-length.
While the bit-flip errors can be decoded as efficiently as the classical code used, the problem of
efficiently decoding the phase-flip errors remains open.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret classical information and quantum information
are intimately related [8, 19]. One can convert a maxi-
mally entangled state shared by two distant parties into
a secret classical key by local bilateral measurements
in the standard basis. Since it is a pure state, it is
decoupled from the environment, and so is the infor-
mation about the measurement outcome. An impor-
tant application of this simple observation is the Shor-
Preskill [20] proof of the security of the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) [1] quantum key distribution (QKD) proto-
col. They convert an entanglement distillation protocol
based on Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum error
correcting codes [7, 22] into a key distribution protocol.
The correspondence often also works in the other direc-
tion. Given a quantum channel or noisy bipartite quan-
tum state, a large class of secret communication protocols
can be made into quantum communication protocols by
performing all the steps “coherently”, i.e. replacing prob-
abilistic mixtures by quantum superpositions [9, 10, 11].
This result was derived in the idealized asymptotic con-
text of quantum Shannon theory, without giving explicit,
let alone efficient, code constructions. Not coincidentally,
these asymptotic codes had a structure reminiscent of
CSS codes.
In this paper we bridge the gap between these asymp-
totic constructions and CSS codes. We obtain a subclass
of CSS codes, called P-CSS codes, by making coherent a
class of private codes studied by Renner and Koenig [17].
The original CSS [7, 22] construction requires two classi-
cal linear finite distance codes which contain each other’s
duals. One is used for correcting bit flip errors, while the
other corrects phase flip errors and was identified in [20]
as being responsible for privacy amplification. The re-
sulting quantum code is also of finite distance.
P-CSS codes involve a combination of a classical er-
ror correcting code and a privacy amplification proto-
col. Consequently, the dual-containing property does not
come into play, which greatly simplifies the construction.
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On the other hand, P-CSS codes are not finite distance
codes. This is not necessarily a problem: modern coding
theory (eg. LDPC [12] and turbo codes [5]) focuses not
on distance but on performance on simple i.i.d. (indepen-
dent, identically distributed) channels. The main result
of this paper is to show that P-CSS codes have excellent
asymptotic behaviour, attaining the hashing bound on
i.i.d. Pauli channels.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we
recall the definition of two-universal hash functions and
how they are used in private codes. We then explain how
they can be turned into quantum codes, and give exam-
ples. In section III, we state and prove the main theorem
which quantifies the performance of our code in terms of
the parameters of the underlying classical error correct-
ing code and privacy amplification protocol. The asymp-
totic rates for entanglement transmission are calculated
in section IV for memoryless qubit Pauli channels. We
conclude in section V with open problems.
II. QUANTUM CODES BASED ON AFFINE
TWO-UNIVERSAL HASH FUNCTIONS
A. Private classical codes by two-universal hashing
Assume a communication scenario in which a sender
Alice is connected to a receiver Bob and eavesdropper
Eve through a noisy classical “wiretap” channel with one
input and two outputs [24]. Alice wants to send messages
to Bob about which Eve is supposed to find out as little
as possible. There are two obstacles Alice and Bob need
to overcome: i) Bob receives only a noisy copy of Alice’s
input, and ii) (partial) information about her input leaks
to Eve. In order to reduce Bob’s noise they must apply
error correction, and in order to increase Eve’s noise they
must perform privacy amplification. Together, the two
form a private code.
An [n, k] linear error correcting code C is a k-
dimensional linear subspace of Zn2 . It can be given either
as the column space of an n× k generator matrix G, so
that C = {Gy : y ∈ Zk2} [25], or the null space of an
(n− k)× n parity check matrix H . The row space of H
is the dual code C⊥ of C. The interpretation is that Al-
2ice encodes her k-bit message y into the n-bit codeword
x = Gy. This is sent down a noisy n-bit channel to Bob,
who then tries to decode the original message y.
Privacy amplification (PA) protocols [2, 3, 13, 17] are
defined in terms of random functions. A random function
from X to Y is a random variable taking values from the
set of functions with domain X and range Y. A random
function f from X to Y is called two-universal if
Pr [f(x) = f(x′)] ≤ 1|Y| ,
for any distinct x, x′ ∈ X .
Suppose Alice has a k bit wiretap channel which is
noiseless to Bob but partially noisy to Eve. Still Eve re-
ceives some information about the identity of the bits,
and the k bits are thus not secure. However, Alice will
settle for transmitting a smaller number of bits m, if it
ensures that they will now be secret from Eve. The PA
protocol is characterized by a two-universal random func-
tion f : Zk2 → Zm2 . Alice starts by drawing a particular
realization of f . To convey the secret message s ∈ Zm2
she encodes it as an equiprobably chosen random element
y of the set Zs(f) = {y : f(y) = s}, and sends that down
the channel. She then publicly announces the realization
of f . Now Bob, knowing y and f , also knows s. On the
other hand, it can be shown [2, 3, 13] that Eve’s correla-
tion with s is exponentially small in k −m.
A private code is a combination of an error correcting
code C and a privacy amplification protocol f . Formally
it is a set of sets {Cs(f) : s ∈ Zm2 }, where Cs(f) = {x :
x = Gy, f(y) = s}. It is used for transmitting m bits of
approximately secret information reliably over an n-bit
wiretap channel which is noisy to Bob. As in the noise-
less case, Alice draws a particular realization of f , and
encodes the secret message s ∈ Zm2 as an equiprobably
chosen random element of the set Cs(f). After transmis-
sion she publicly announces the realization of f to enable
Bob to decode the message.
B. The P-CSS code construction
Following [9], we can construct quantum codes by
coherifying the private code {Cs(f) : s ∈ Zm2 }. We
will work in the computational qubit orthonormal ba-
sis {|0〉, |1〉} and the corresponding n-qubit basis {|x〉 :
x ∈ Zn2 }, where |(x1, x2, . . . xn)〉 = |x1〉|x2〉 . . . |xn〉. An
[[n, k]] quantum code C is a 2k-dimensional subspace of
the space of n-qubits (see eg. [16] and references therein).
It is used to encode k qubits into n, by unitarily trans-
forming the standard k-qubit basis vectors into a partic-
ular basis of C. The basis vectors of C are referred to
as the quantum codewords of C. Given the private code
{Cs(f) : s ∈ Zm2 }, we define its quantum counterpart C
by quantum codewords {|ϕs(f)〉 : s ∈ Zm2 }, with
|ϕs(f)〉 = 1√
2k−m
∑
x∈Cs(f)
|x〉. (1)
More precisely, this defines a random quantum code, as
for each realization of f we have a potentially different
C. We may occasionally be sloppy about this distinction.
Recall that a quantum code is called a stabilizer code if
it is the simultaneous +1 eigenspace of a set of k indepen-
dent n-qubit Pauli operators (called the “stabilizers”). A
CSS code is a stabilizer code, each stabilizer of which is
composed of purely Z or purelyX operators. It is defined
by two classical error correcting codes C1 and C2, with
parity check matrices H1 and H2, respectively, such that
C⊥2 ⊆ C1. The set of stabilizers of the CSS code is given
by {ZH1 , XH2}, where ZH = {Zh : h is a row ofH},
etc., and Zh = Zh1 ⊗ . . . Zhn , h = (h1, . . . , hn). Bit flip
errors are corrected by the Z stabilizers, and phase flip
errors are corrected by the X stabilizers. CSS codes can
alternatively be given in terms of codewords:
|x+ C⊥2 〉 =
1√
|C⊥2 |
∑
y∈C⊥
2
|x+ y〉 (2)
where x runs over the elements of C1. It is easy to see
that |x + C⊥2 〉 only depends on the coset of C1/C⊥2 to
which x belongs, so we can let x only run over suitably
chosen coset representatives xs.
The expression (2) very much resembles (1). We next
show that if the random function f is affine, or rather
that each of its realizations is affine, then each realization
of C is indeed a CSS code. Assume f is of the form
s = f(y) = Ay + s0, (3)
for some s0 ∈ Zm2 and full rankm×k matrix A. Denoting
the null space of A by C′′, we see that y lies in the coset
of Zk2/C
′′ determined by s− s0. Let F be a k × (k −m)
matrix whose column space is equal to C′′ (if we think of
A as a sort of parity check matrix, then F would be the
corresponding generator matrix). Then the set Zs(f) =
{y : f(y) = s} can be written as
Zs(f) = {Ft+ ys : t ∈ Zk−m2 },
where the ys are the coset representatives of Z
k
2/C
′′.
Hence Cs(f) = {x : x = Gy, y ∈ Zs(f)} can be writ-
ten as
Cs(f) = {GFt+ xs : t ∈ Zk−m2 },
where xs = Gys are the coset representatives of C/C
′,
and C′ is the column space of the n × (k − m) matrix
GF . Thus the quantum code C with codewords (1) is the
CSS code composed from the classical codes C and (C′)⊥
with parity check matrices H and (GF )T , respectively.
Its stabilizers are thus {ZH , X(GF )T )}. Observe that the
quantum code C is independent of the constant term s0
from the definition of f (3); its only effect is to permute
the quantum codewords.
To recapitulate, H and G are the parity check matrix
and generator matrix of the classical code C, respectively.
F comes from the affine structure of the two universal
3hash function f . Since HG = 0, we also have H(GF ) =
0, so the bit flip and phase flip codes are automatically
contained in each other’s duals. We dubbed the CSS
codes thus obtained P-CSS codes.
C. Examples
We will illustrate our construction by using a particu-
lar class of affine two-universal hash functions taken from
[3, 23]. There is a natural bijection between Zk2 and poly-
nomials in ζ ∈ GF (2k) (ζ2k−1 = 1) of degree k − 1 over
GF (2) :
y = (y0, ..., yk−1) ⇔ y(ζ) =
k−1∑
i=0
yiζ
i .
Therefore, we can define linear maps :
α(y(ζ)) = y and α−1(y) = y(ζ) .
For a, b ∈ GF (2k) (a 6= 0), the polynomial
qa,b(y(ζ)) = ay(ζ) + b
defines a permutation of GF (2k), which induces a per-
mutation πa,b : Z
k
2 → Zk2 by
πa,b = α ◦ qa,b ◦ α−1.
For any fixed m ≤ k, define the map τ : Zk2 → Zm2 which
projects onto the first m bits:
τ((y1, ..., yk)) = (y1, ..., ym).
Define the function ha,b(y) : Z
k
2 → Zm2 as the composition
ha,b = τ ◦ πa,b,
and the set
P = {ha,b|a, b ∈ GF (2k), a 6= 0}.
The random function f which is uniformly distributed on
P is known to be two-universal. Moreover, each ha,b is a
composition of affine functions, and hence affine. As ob-
served earlier, the resulting CSS code will be independent
of the value of b.
Our first set of examples are [[7, 1]] CSS codes. We
take n = 7, k = 4 and m = 1. For C we take the [7, 4, 3]
Hamming code given by
GT =

1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
 , H =
 0 0 0 1 1 1 10 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 ,
Different values of a ∈ GF (16) will in general give rise
to different CSS codes. If we choose a = ζ−2 (ζ15 = 1),
then
F =

0 1 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
1 0 0
 , (GF )T =
 0 0 0 1 1 1 11 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
 .
The constructed seven qubit quantum code is none
other than the [[7, 1, 3]] Steane code with stabilizers
{ZH , X(GF )T } ={
Z4Z5Z6Z7, Z2Z3Z6Z7, Z1Z2Z5Z6,
X4X5X6X7, X2X3X6X7, X1X2X5X6
}
.
On the other hand, if we choose a = ζ, we have
F =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
 , (GF )T =
 1 0 0 0 0 1 10 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0
 .
This code has stabilizers{
Z4Z5Z6Z7, Z2Z3Z6Z7, Z1Z2Z5Z6,
X1X6X7, X2X5X7, X3X5X6
}
.
which can not correct the Z4 error, and hence does not
have distance 3.
III. ENTANGLEMENT TRANSMISSION OVER
PAULI CHANNELS
From the examples from the previous section we saw
that, unlike the original CSS construction, the P-CSS
construction does not tell us anything about the distance
of the obtained quantum code. So in what sense is this
construction useful? What can we say about the error
correction properties of P-CSS codes?
What can be quantified is the performance of P-CSS
codes on Pauli channels. In this section we will define the
communication scenario of interest, and prove a theorem
about the quality of entanglement that can be transmit-
ted through such channels, given the properties of the
classical code C and parameters of the hash function f
which comprise the P-CSS code. The central tool is a
theorem by Renner and Koenig [17] regarding quantum
privacy amplification (see Appendix).
An n-qubit Pauli channel Nn, which applies Pauli er-
rors XuZv with probability pu,v, can be described as
Nn(ρ) =
∑
u,v∈Zn
2
pu,vX
uZvρZvXu ,
where u = (u1, ..., un) and v = (v1, ..., vn) are binary
vectors of length n. We can equivalently represent the
action of Nn as
Nn(ρ) = TrE UA→BENn (ρ),
4where the isometry UNn is defined by its action on the
computational basis states |x〉A, x ∈ Zn2 , as
UNn |x〉A = |φx〉BE =
∑
u,v
√
pu,v(−1)x·v|x+ u〉B|u, v〉E .
(4)
The interpretation is that, in being sent through the
channel, Alice’s pure input state |x〉A undergoes an isom-
etry which splits it up between Bob’s output system B
and the unobservable environment E. This is analogous
to the wire-tap channel with the environment playing the
role of the eavesdropper Eve. Both Eve and Bob receive
the state only partially.
We are concerned with the task of entanglement trans-
mission. Alice is handed the A′ part of the m ebit state
(|Φ〉⊗m)RA′ , where
|Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉),
the other half of which belongs to a reference system R
which Alice cannot access. The objective is to use the
channel Nn to transfer the purification of R to Bob, so
that Bob ends up sharing an m ebit state (|Φ〉⊗m)RB′
with R. In most cases this can be done only approxi-
mately.
Formally, an [[n,m]] entanglement generation code
consists of an encoding isometry UA
′→A
C (which takes the
standard m-qubit basis to the codewords of C) and a de-
coding operation DB→B′ . It is said to be η-good if∥∥∥D ◦ Nn ◦ UC(Φ⊗m)RA′ − (Φ⊗m)RB′∥∥∥
1
≤ η.
The P-CSS code C which we will use for entanglement
transmission consists of an [n, k] code C with parity check
matrix H , and an affine random two-universal hash func-
tion f : Zk2 → Zm2 . The performance of the quantum code
will be given in terms of the performance of the classical
code C, which involves the bit flip errors u. To decode
C one measures the error syndrome e = Hu. While the
syndrome is uniquely determined by the error, the re-
verse is usually not the case. One needs to define the
“inverse syndrome” function uˆ : Zn−k2 → Zn2 , for which
Huˆ(e) = e. Now G, H and uˆ fully specify the classical
encoding and decoding operations. Define
pu =
∑
v
pu,v (5)
pe =
∑
u:Hu = e
pu (6)
pu,v|e = I(Hu = e)pu,v/pe, (7)
pu|e = I(Hu = e)pu/pe, (8)
ǫ(e) = 1− puˆ(e)|e, (9)
ǫ =
∑
e
peǫ(e). (10)
Here pu is the marginal probability of bit flip error u
occurring, pe is the probability of the bit flip error syn-
drome being e, pu|e is the probability of the bit flip error
being u conditional on observing the syndrome e, and
ǫ(e) and ǫ are the probabilities of incorrectly identifying
the bit flip error with and without conditioning on the
syndrome e, respectively.
We can now formulate our main theorem.
Theorem 1 Given an n-qubit Pauli channel Nn, a clas-
sical linear [n, k] code C with average error probabil-
ity ǫ, and an affine random two-universal hash function
f : Zk2 → Zm2 , there exists a random [[n,m]] P-CSS en-
tanglement generation code which is on average η-good
on Nn, with
η = 2
√
2ǫ′ + 4
√
2ǫ+ 2
√
2ǫ ,
ǫ′ = 2−
1
2
(H2(XE)ω−H0(E)ω+k−n−m), and
ωXBE =
1
2n
∑
x∈Zn
2
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |φx〉〈φx|BE . (11)
H2 and H0 denote Re´nyi entropies (see Appendix for
details), and the state ωXBE is the result of sending a
randomly chosen computational basis element through the
Pauli channel Nn.
Proof We will break up the proof into a number of
steps.
1. Imagine Alice sends the state |x〉, x ∈ C, through
the channel, resulting in the state |φx〉BE defined in (4).
Measuring the stabilizers {ZH}, with probability pe, Bob
will get the syndrome e and state
|φx(e)〉BE =
∑
u:Hu=e,v
√
pu,v|e(−1)x·v|x+ u〉B|u, v〉E ,
where pe and pu,v|e are defined in (6) and (8). Bob applies
X uˆ(e) to correct the bit flip errors, resulting in
|φ′x(e)〉 =
√
1− ǫ(e)|x〉B |ψgoodx (e)〉E +
√
ǫ(e)|ψbadx (e)〉BE ,
where
|ψgoodx (e)〉E = |uˆ(e)〉E1
∑
v
√
pv|uˆ(e)(−1)x·v|v〉E2 ,
and |ψbadx (e)〉BE corresponds to {u 6= uˆ(e) : Hu = e}, i.e.
the errors that fail to get corrected.
Since |ψbadx (e)〉BE is orthogonal to |x〉B|ψgoodx (e)〉E , we
have (see Appendix for details about the fidelity F )
F
(|φ′x(e)〉BE , |x〉B|ψgoodx (e)〉E) = 1− ǫ(e) . (12)
2. If Alice send the quantum codeword
|ϕs〉 = 1√
2k−m
∑
z∈C′
|xs + z〉,
and Bob performs the same steps as above, the resulting
state is
1√
2k−m
∑
z∈C′
|φ′xs+z(e)〉BE , (13)
5which has fidelity 1− ǫ(e) with
1√
2k−m
∑
z∈C′
|xs + z〉B|ψgoodxs+z(e)〉E . (14)
3. Let {Ei = vi + C′⊥ : i ∈ Zk−m2 } denote the cosets
of C′⊥ in Zn2 , with C
′ defined as in Section IIB. Recall
also that {xs : s ∈ Zm2 } were defined as the coset repre-
sentatives of C/C′. Since z · v = z · vi for all v ∈ Ei and
z ∈ C′, we can rewrite the state (14) as∑
i∈Zk−m
2
|ϕs,i〉B |θs,i(e)〉E , (15)
with
|ϕs,i〉B = 1√
2k−m
∑
z∈C′
(−1)z·vi |z + xs〉B ,
|θs,i(e)〉E = |uˆ(e)〉E1 ⊗
∑
v∈Ei
√
pv|uˆ(e)(−1)xs·v|v〉E2 . (16)
Observe that {|ϕs,i〉B : s ∈ Zm2 , i ∈ Zk−m2 } are a basis
for the system B, and there exists a Clifford unitary U :
|ϕs,i〉B 7→ |s〉B1 |i〉B2 .
Bob applies U , resulting in a state |Υs(e)〉B1B2E which
has fidelity 1− ǫ(e) with
|Υ˜s(e)〉B1B2E = |s〉B1
∑
i
|i〉B2 |θs,i(e)〉E . (17)
4. Now we need to ensure that there is no s dependence
of the state of the environment E. As we will see this has
to do with the performance of the private code on which
our P-CSS code is based.
By Lemma 1 below,
1
2m
∑
s
Ef
∥∥σEs − σE0 ∥∥1 ≤ 2ǫ′, (18)
where σEs =
1
2k−m
∑
z∈C′ φ
E
z+xs , φ
E
x = TrB |φx〉〈φx|BE ,
and ǫ′ = 2−
1
2
(H2(XE)ω−H0(E)ω+k−n−m). It is easy to see
that
Υ˜s(e)
E =
1
2k−m
∑
z∈C′
ψgoodxs+z(e)
E .
On the other hand, since φExs+z =
∑
e peφxs+z(e)
E , it
follows that
σEs =
∑
e
pe
1
2k−m
∑
z∈C′
φxs+z(e)
E .
From the concavity (A4) and monotonicity (A2) of fi-
delity, and (12) we have
F
(
σEs ,
∑
e
peΥ˜s(e)
E
)
≥
(∑
e,z
pe
2k−m
√
F
(
φxs+z(e)
E , ψgoodxs+z(e)
E
))2
≥
(∑
e
pe(1 − ǫ(e))
)2
≥ 1− 2ǫ .
Then by (A1), for all s we have∥∥∥∥∥σEs −∑
e
peΥ˜s(e)
E
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ǫ . (19)
By the triangle inequality for trace distance, we can com-
bine (18) and (19) to get
1
2m
∑
s
Ef
∥∥∥∥∥∑
e
peΥ˜s(e)
E −
∑
e
peΥ˜0(e)
E
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2ǫ′+4
√
2ǫ .
(20)
Since Υ˜s(e)
E =
∑
i |θs,i(e)〉〈θs,i(e)|E and {θs,i(e)}i,e is
an orthogonal set, we can express the privacy condition
(20) as
1
2m
∑
s,e,i
peEf
∥∥θs,i(e)E − θ0,i(e)E∥∥1 ≤ 2ǫ′ + 4√2ǫ .
Set |θs,i(e)〉E =
√
qi(e) |θˆs,i(e)〉E , where |θˆs,i(e)〉E is nor-
malized, qi(e) =
∑
v∈Ei
pv|uˆ(e) depends on f through Ei,
and
∑
i qi(e) = 1. Thus by (A1) we have
1
2m
∑
s,e,i
peEf
[
qi(e)
(
1−
∣∣∣〈θˆs,i(e)|θˆ0,i(e)〉∣∣∣)] ≤ ǫ′+2√2ǫ .
(21)
5. Steps 2-4 considered Alice sending a single codeword
through the channel. Now we are ready for the actual
task of entanglement transmission. Alice is handed the
A′ part of the state
(Φ⊗m)RA
′
=
1√
2m
∑
s∈Zm
2
|s〉R|s〉A′ .
She performs the encoding UC : |s〉A′ 7→ |ϕs〉A′ and sends
the output down the channel. Bob performs all the op-
erations in steps 2-4 and the resulting state (conditional
on syndrome e) is
|Υ(e)〉 = 1√
2m
∑
s
|s〉R|Υs(e)〉B1B2E .
Define also
|Υ˜(e)〉 = 1√
2m
∑
s
|s〉R|Υ˜s(e)〉B1B2E ,
6and
|Υˆ(e)〉 = 1√
2m
∑
s,i
|s〉R|s〉B1(−1)b(s,i)|i〉B2 |θ0,i(e)〉E ,
with
(−1)b(s,i) = 〈θˆs,i(e)|θˆ0,i(e)〉∣∣∣〈θˆs,i(e)|θˆ0,i(e)〉∣∣∣ .
Thus
〈Υ˜(e)|Υˆ(e)〉 = 1
2m
∑
s,i
qi(e)(−1)b(s,i)〈θˆs,i(e)|θˆ0,i(e)〉
=
1
2m
∑
s,i
qi(e)
∣∣∣〈θˆs,i(e)|θˆ0,i(e)〉∣∣∣ .
Averaging over all the possible syndromes, we can define
Υ =
∑
e
peΥ(e)
RB1B2E ,
and similarly Υ˜ and Υ˜0.
Then by the concavity (A4) of fidelity, the property
of convex function (i.e. EX2 ≥ (EX)2) and the privacy
condition (21), we have
EfF (Υˆ
RB1B2E , Υ˜RB1B2E)
≥ Ef
(∑
e
pe
√
F
(
|Υˆ(e)〉, |Υ˜(e)〉
))2
≥
 1
2m
∑
s,i,e
peEf
[
qi(e)
∣∣∣〈θˆs,i(e)|θˆ0,i(e)〉∣∣∣]
2
≥ 1− 2ǫ′ − 4
√
2ǫ .
It is not hard to see that
F
(
ΥRB1B2E , Υ˜RB1B2E
)
≥ 1− 2ǫ ,
since by the concavity (A4) of fidelity, the fact that trace-
preserving quantum operations never reduce fidelity, and
condition (12) we have
F
(
Υ, Υ˜
)
≥
(∑
e
pe
√
F
(
Υ(e), Υ˜(e)
))2
≥
(∑
e
pe(1 − ǫ(e))
)2
≥ 1− 2ǫ .
Combining the results above, by (A1) we have
Ef‖Υ− Υˆ‖1 ≤ Ef‖Υ− Υ˜‖1 + Ef‖Υ˜− Υˆ‖1 ≤ η
with η = 2
√
2ǫ′ + 4
√
2ǫ+ 2
√
2ǫ.
Finally Bob performs the decoupling unitary
V B1B2 =
∑
s,i
(−1)b(s,i)|s〉〈s|B1 ⊗ |i〉〈i|B2 ,
and throws away the B2 system (and also implicitly E
which he never had access to anyway). This combined
operation takes Υˆ to the desired state
1√
2m
∑
s∈Zm
2
|s〉R|s〉B1 . (22)
By the monotonicity of trace distance (A3), it takes the
actual state Υ to a state which, on average, is η-close to
(22) in trace distance. Hence the average performance of
the code (averaging over f) is η-good, as claimed. This
averaging can be treated in two ways. Alice and Bob
could start with pre-shared randomness, based on which
they choose f . More simply, if the codes are good on
average, then at least one does at least as well as the
average.
It is worth summing up Bob’s decoding operation. He
first measures the stabilizers {ZH}, obtaining the bit
flip error syndrome e, and applies X uˆ(e) to correct the
bit flip errors. To deal with the phase errors, he per-
forms UB→B1B2 followed by V B1B2 and discarding B2.
This phase-correcting combined operation can be imple-
mented in a simpler, less coherent way. Instead of per-
forming U , he measures the stabilizers {X(GF )T }, thus
uniquely determining i. Based on i he performs the uni-
tary
V Bi =
∑
s
(−1)b(s,i)|ϕs,i〉〈ϕs,i|, (23)
which corrects the phase error. Finally, he un-encodes
with U−1C .
It is important to note that V Bi need not be efficiently
implementable, which is a realistic problem when the
code length becomes large (see Discussion).
✷
Lemma 1 In notation from the proof of Theorem 1,
1
2m
∑
s
Ef
∥∥σEs (f)− σE0 (f)∥∥1 ≤ 2ǫ′, (24)
where σEs (f) =
1
2k−m
∑
z∈C′ φ
E
z+xs and where ǫ
′ =
2−
1
2
(H2(XE)ω−H0(E)ω+k−n−m).
Proof Consider the state
σY E =
1
2k
∑
y∈Zk
2
|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ φEGy . (25)
By Lemma 3, we have the privacy condition
Ef
∥∥σSE(f)− τS ⊗ σE∥∥
1
≤ 2− 12 (H2(Y E)σ−H0(E)σ−m) ,
(26)
7with
σSE(f) =
1
2m
∑
s∈Zm
2
|s〉〈s|S ⊗ σEs (f) ,
where
σEs (f) =
1
2k−m
∑
y:f(y)=s
φEGy =
1
2k−m
∑
z∈C′
φExs+z
and τS = 12m
∑
s |s〉〈s|S is the maximally mixed state.
By the relations (see Appendix E for details)
H2(Y E)σ = H2(XE)ω− (n− k) and H0(E)σ ≥ H0(E)ω,
with ω defined in (11), the condition (26) can be easily
generalized as
Ef
∥∥σSE(f)− τS ⊗ σE∥∥
1
≤ 2− 12 (H2(XE)ω−H0(E)ω+k−n−m) .
This can be rewritten as
1
2m
∑
s
Ef
∥∥σEs (f)− σE∥∥1 ≤ ǫ′ ,
where ǫ′ = 2−
1
2
(H2(XE)ω−H0(E)ω+k−n−m). Without loss
of generality, we can assume that
Ef ||σE0 (f)− σE ||1 ≤ ǫ′,
and therefore we have
1
2m
∑
s
Ef
∥∥σEs (f)− σE0 (f)∥∥1 ≤ 2ǫ′ . (27)
✷
IV. CODE PERFORMANCE ON MEMORYLESS
QUBIT PAULI CHANNELS
We now consider the important case of i.i.d. (indepen-
dent and identically distributed) or tensor power chan-
nels Nn = Nˆ⊗n, where Nˆ is a single qubit Pauli channel:
Nˆ (ρ) =
∑
u,v∈Z2
pu,vX
uZvρZvXu .
First, we need to characterize the error parameter η from
Theorem 1 using smooth Re´nyi entropy. Recall that
ǫ′ = 2−
1
2
(H2(XE)ω−H0(E)ω+k−n−m) ,
is the error parameter introduced to describe the privacy
amplification condition (18). Then by Corollary 1 (see
Appendix), we can replace ǫ′ by
ǫ1 = 2
− 1
2
(Hδ∞(XE)ω−H
δ
0
(E)ω+k−n−m) + 2δ . (28)
For our i.i.d. case we have ω = ωˆ⊗n with
ωˆXBE =
1
2
∑
x∈Z2
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ UNˆ |x〉〈x|U †Nˆ .
Then as n→∞, by Lemma 2 we have
1
n
Hδ∞(XE)ωˆ⊗n → H(XE)ωˆ + o(δ) ,
1
n
Hδ0 (E)ωˆ⊗n → H(E)ωˆ + o(δ) .
Observing H(X)ωˆ = 1, then as n→∞ we have
1
n
Hδ∞(XE)ω −
1
n
Hδ0 (E)ω − 1→ −I(X ;E)ωˆ + o(δ) .
Notice that the state ωXBE represents the classical-
quantum correlation for Alice sending classical strings
over a Pauli channel. A memoryless Pauli channel works
as a classical binary symmetric channel for classical in-
formation. So there exist good classical [n, k] codes such
as LDPC codes with rates
k
n
= I(X ;B)ωˆ −∆
approaching the classical Shannon capacity
I(X ;B)ωˆ = 1−H({p00 + p01, p10 + p11})
since we have
ωˆXB =
1
2
∑
x∈Z2
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ((p00 + p01)|x〉〈x|B
+ (p10 + p11)|x+ 1〉〈x+ 1|B) ,
and the error probability ǫ→ 0 as n→∞, where p is the
probability of a bit flip error and ∆ is a constant which
can be made quite small [12, 14, 15, 18, 21].
Hence, as n → ∞, the error parameter ǫ1 defined by
(28) approaches a limit, i.e.
ǫ1 → ǫ2 = 2− 12{n[C−∆+o(δ)]−m} + 2δ ,
where
C = I(X ;B)ωˆ − I(X ;E)ωˆ = 1−H({p00, p01, p10, p11})
is the hashing bound on the Pauli channel [4]. Therefore,
the rate of our entanglement generation codes can go up
to
m
n
= C −∆ ,
such that ǫ2 → 0 as n→∞ and δ → 0.
Therefore, if we employ LDPC codes as our classical
codes, we can get a family of η-good entanglement gen-
eration codes with code rate approaching the hashing
bound of the memoryless Pauli channels and the error
parameter η → 0 as n→∞.
Here we want to present an example of P-CSS codes
based on an LDPC code from David Mackay’s classical
paper [14]. The classical code is a Gallager code [12]
with n = 19839, k = 9839 and each column of its parity
check matrix has weight t = 3. For practical purpose,
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Figure 1: The error parameter η vs the quantum code rate
RQ for the Gallager code n = 19839, k = 9839 and column
weight t = 3.
we shall extend the error parameter ǫ defined by (10) to
include both detected and undetected errors [26]. For bit
flip error probability equal to 0.076, the paper gave an
estimate of the block error probability to be 2.62× 10−5,
not specified to be detected or undetected errors. So
2.62× 10−5 is an optimistic estimate of total block error
probability.
Then we consider the code performance on an iid de-
polarizing channel
Nˆ (ρ) = (1 − p)ρ+ p
3
(XρX + Y ρY + ZρZ).
Since n is large enough, we can estimate ǫ′ by ǫ′ =
2−
1
2
(−nI(X;E)ωˆ+k−m) and for p = 0.076 ∗ 3/2 = 0.114,
we have I(X ;E)ωˆ = 0.3046, C = 0.3074. By setting
RQ = m/n, we can plot η vs RQ in Fig.1. We see that
η stabilizes at 0.3548 right after RQ < 0.19. Note that
η is a rough upper-bound for the real error, which is be-
lieved to be much smaller than 0.3548. So Fig.1 is just
for illustration purpose and it should not be considered
as the real code performance.
V. DISCUSSION
We have studied a subclass of CSS codes called P-CSS
codes, which are based on a classical error correcting code
and a two-universal hash function. P-CSS codes are very
flexible and easy to construct, and have excellent asymp-
totic performance. However, there are several drawbacks,
relative to the traditional finite-distance CSS codes, that
deserve further study. The phase-flip correcting unitary
operation Vi from (23) suffers from two kinds of inefficien-
cies. First, it is not a tensor power of single qubit op-
erations, but a generic n-qubit operation. Contrast this
to the usual way of correcting phase-flip errors: given
the error syndrome i ∈ Zk−m2 , one associates to it the
most probable error vˆ(i) ∈ Zn2 (cf. the function uˆ(e) for
bit-flip errors), and performs Z vˆ(i). In particular there
is no s-dependence as in b(s, i) from (23). Second, even
if the phase-flip correcting unitary is of the form Z vˆ(i),
the function vˆ(i) may not be efficiently computable. This
issue is not present for uˆ(e) if we use an efficiently de-
codable LDPC code for C. We believe that at least the
first issue can be overcome by modifying the Theorem 1
proof technique. Finally, the error parameter η is a rough
upper-bound of the real error and a better bound will be
highly desired for applications.
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Appendix A: FIDELITY AND TRACE DISTANCE
It is necessary to recall some facts about trace dis-
tances, fidelities, and purifications (mostly taken from
[16]). The trace distance between two density operators
ρ and σ can be defined as
||ρ− σ||1 = Tr |ρ− σ|,
where |A| ≡
√
A†A is the positive square root of A†A.
The fidelity of two density operators with respect to each
other can be defined as
F (ρ, σ) = ‖√ρ√σ‖21.
For two pure states |χ〉, |ζ〉 this amounts to
F (|χ〉, |ζ〉) = |〈χ|ζ〉|2.
The following relation between fidelity and trace dis-
tance will be needed:
1−
√
F (ρ, σ) ≤ 1
2
‖ρ− σ‖1 ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ), (A1)
the second inequality becoming an equality for pure
states.
A purification |Φρ〉RB of a density operator ρB is some
pure state living in an augmented quantum system RB
such that TrR(|Φρ〉〈Φρ|RB) = ρB. Any two purifications
|Φρ〉RB and |Φ′ρ〉RB of ρB are related by some local uni-
tary U on the reference system R
|Φ′ρ〉RB = (UR ⊗ IB)|Φρ〉RB.
A theorem by Uhlmann states that, for a fixed purifica-
tion Φσ of σ,
F (ρ, σ) = max
Φρ
F (|Φρ〉, |Φσ〉).
A corollary of this theorem is the monotonicity property
of fidelity
F (ρRB, σRB) ≤ F (ρB, σB), (A2)
9where ρB = TrR ρ
RB and σB = TrR σ
RB . The corre-
sponding monotonicity property of trace distance is
||ρRB − σRB ||1 ≥ ||ρB − σB ||1 . (A3)
Another important property of fidelity is concavity
F
(∑
i
piρi,
∑
i
qiσi
)
≥
(∑
i
√
piqi
√
F (ρi, σi)
)2
,
(A4)
where pi ≥ 0, qi ≥ 0, and
∑
i pi =
∑
i qi = 1.
Appendix B: RE´NYI ENTROPY
The following definitions and properties of Re´nyi en-
tropy are mostly taken from [17]. For α ∈ [0,∞] and a
density operator ρ, the Re´nyi entropy of order α of ρ is
defined by
Hα(ρ) :=
1
1− α log2(Tr(ρ
α)) ,
with the convention Hα(ρ) := limβ→αHβ(ρ) for α ∈
{0, 1,∞}.
In particular, for α = 0, H0(ρ) = log2(rank(ρ)); for
α = 1, H1(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy H(ρ); for α =
∞, H∞(ρ) = − log2(λmax(ρ)), where λmax(ρ) denotes
the maximum eigenvalue of ρ. Furthermore, for α, β ∈
[0,∞],
α ≤ β ⇔ Hα(ρ) ≥ Hβ(ρ) .
The definition of Re´nyi entropy for density operators
can be generalized to the notion of smooth Re´nyi entropy.
For α ∈ [0,∞], ǫ ≥ 0 and a density operator ρ, the ǫ-
smooth Re´nyi entropy of order α of ρ is defined by
Hǫα(ρ) :=

inf
σ∈Bǫ(ρ)
Hα(σ), 0 ≤ α < 1
sup
σ∈Bǫ(ρ)
Hα(σ), 1 < α ≤ ∞
where Bǫ(ρ) = {σ : ||ρ− σ||1 ≤ ǫ} and Hǫ1(ρ) = H(ρ).
In the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
case, the smooth Re´nyi entropy 1
n
Hǫα(ρ
⊗n) of the state
ρ⊗n will equal its Shannon entropy H(ρ) as n goes to
infinity.
Lemma 2 For a density operator and any α ∈ [0,∞],
lim
ǫ→0
lim
n→∞
Hǫα(ρ
⊗n)
n
= H(ρ), ∀α ∈ [0,∞] . (B1)
Appendix C: UNIVERSALLY COMPOSABLE
PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
Now we are ready to introduce an important lemma
by Renner and Ko¨nig [17].
Lemma 3 For a classical-quantum system Y E with
state σY E =
∑
y∈Y p(y)|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ σEy , let f be a two-
universal function on Y with range Zm2 , which is inde-
pendent of Y E. Then
Ef
∥∥∥∥∥∑
s
q(s|f)|s〉〈s|S ⊗ σEs (f)− τS ⊗ σE
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ ,
where
ǫ = 2−
1
2
(H2(Y E)σ−H0(E)σ−m) ,
S = f(Y ) with probability distribution q, σEs (f) =
1
q(s|f)
∑
y∈f−1(s) p(y)σ
E
y with f
−1(s) = {y|f(y) = s}, and
τS = 12m
∑
s |s〉〈s|S is the maximally mixed state.
The result of Lemma 3 can be generalized to smooth
Re´nyi entropy.
Corollary 1 For a classical-quantum system Y E with
state σY E =
∑
y∈Y p(y)|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ σEy , let f be a two-
universal function on Y with range Zm2 , which is inde-
pendent of Y E. Then for ǫ ≥ 0
Ef
∥∥∥∥∥∑
s
q(s|f)|s〉〈s|S ⊗ σEs (f)− τS ⊗ σE
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ′ ,
where
ǫ′ = 2−
1
2
(Hǫ∞(Y E)σ−H
ǫ
0
(E)σ−m) + 2ǫ ,
S = f(Y ) with probability distribution q, σEs (f) =
1
q(s|f)
∑
y∈f−1(s) p(y)σ
E
y with f
−1(s) = {y|f(y) = s}, and
τS = 12m
∑
s |s〉〈s|S is the maximally mixed state.
Appendix D: EVALUATING RE´NYI ENTROPY
FOR PAULI CHANNELS
Given the expression (4) of |φx〉BE , we have
φEx =
∑
u
pu|u〉〈u|E1 ⊗ |φx,u〉〈φx,u|E2 ,
with |φx,u〉E2 =
∑
v
√
pv|u(−1)v·x|v〉E2 .
Observe that Tr(φEx )
2 =
∑
u p
2
u is independent of X .
Then for ωXBE defined by (11) and σY E defined by (25),
we have
H2(Y E)σ = k − log2
(∑
u
p2u
)
,
H2(XE)ω = n− log2
(∑
u
p2u
)
.
So H2(XE)ω = n− k +H2(Y E)σ.
To show H0(E)ω ≥ H0(E)σ, we need to introduce
Weyl’s monotonicity theorem [6]. For a Hermitian oper-
ator A, define λ↓(A) = (λ↓1(A), . . . , λ
↓
n(A)), where eigen-
values λ↓j (A) are arranged in decreasing order.
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Theorem 2 (Weyl’s monotonicity theorem) If A
is Hermitian and B is positive, then for all j
λ↓j (A+B) ≥ λ↓j (A) .
Then if both A and B are density operators, the num-
ber of positive eigenvalues of A + B should be no less
than that of A, i.e. rank(A + B) ≥ rank(A). Note the
definition of σXE can be generalized to σXEℓ by changing
the classical code C to the ℓth coset of C in Zn2 . Given
ωE = 1
2n−k
∑
ℓ σ
E
ℓ , we have rank(ω
E) ≥ rank(σEℓ ), i.e.
H0(E)ω ≥ H0(E)σℓ for all ℓ.
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